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• Russia has increased its security measures in 
the Barents and Baltic Sea regions in the past 
decade. However, the focus has mainly been on 
the Northern Fleet and its nuclear capabilities, a 
cornerstone of Russian strategic thinking.
• Russia’s threat perception follows a traditional 
view of security which focuses on the protection 
of state security. 
• Whether Russia will maintain or even increase 
its military activity in the future depends highly 
on the country’s economic development. 
TAKEAWAYS
Russia’s threat perceptions  
in the Barents and Baltic Sea regions 
Throughout the past decades, Russia has 
increased its security policy measures in the 
Barents and Baltic Sea regions.1 The Barents 
Sea region is usually defined as the area 
covering the Kola Peninsula and the adjacent 
waters, the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea, 
and the southern parts of the Arctic Ocean, 
including Svalbard and Franz Josef Land. 
The Baltic Sea region comprises the area 
surrounding the Baltic Sea, such as parts of 
Russia, Poland, Germany, the three Baltic states 
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), and three 
of the Nordic countries (Finland, Denmark 
and Sweden). Both regions are essential 
for training, patrol and transit areas for the 
Russian navy and ground forces. The airspace 
above these regions also plays a vital role 
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argues, the differences can be explained even 
better by looking at a broad spectrum of threat 
perceptions.  
Russia’s threat perceptions
Official Russian threat perceptions, 
communicated in security policy documents, 
range from political and military, socio-
economic and demographic, scientific, 
technological and educational, public health 
and even cultural developments.6 However, 
Russia’s actions show a greater importance 
attached to traditional security threats, that 
is, “the ability of a state to protect itself from 
external threats with the use of military force 
and violence”.7 External threats may come from 
other states or international organisations. 
When threats occur, Russia has usually 
legitimised the use of military resources to 
defend its interests, because it focuses on 
military capabilities rather than intentions. 
For example, in April 2021, Russia’s military 
began working systematically to increase 
combat capabilities and strengthen its defence 
in Russia’s western borders as a response 
to NATO allies’ increased presence.8 Hence, 
as Russia, to a large degree, follows a more 
traditional view of the security concept, this 
insight will focus on the same understanding
Examining the traditional threats addressed 
in Russia’s security policy documents, it 
becomes clear that Russia’s threat perception 
in the Barents Sea region includes, among 
other things, NATO’s desire to deploy military 
contingents in countries contiguous with the 
Russian Federation and its allies, as well as 
in adjacent waters, and the establishment 
and deployment of the strategic US missile 
defence system. Other threats highlighted by 
the documents are unresolved legal issues and 
the presence of the territorial claims against 
the Russian Federation, including coastal 
territories and adjacent water areas; and the 
growing competition for natural resources 
combined with declining energy production 
and dwindling natural resources. These threat 
perceptions are used to legitimise why Russia 
increased its security more in the Barents Sea 
region than the Baltic Sea region. 
While a number of security documents have 
due to Russia’s increasing aerial patrols in 
2007.2 Since then, there has been an ongoing 
deployment of new weapon systems with 
increased range and accuracy in both regions, 
increasing Russia’s power projection capacity 
and adding tactical flexibility and strategic 
leverage. By strengthening its military forces in 
all three branches, Russia has improved both 
nuclear and conventional capabilities and is 
now capable of supporting its anti-access area 
denial zones.
Despite the similarities, Russia has 
increased its security more in the Barents Sea 
region than in the Baltic Sea region. In 2007, 
Russia stepped up its exercises and resumed 
its long-range bomber patrols in the Barents 
Sea region.3 In the Baltic Sea region, a similar 
increase in aerial activity was not observed 
until 2014.4 Similarly, naval activities have 
also increased in the Barents Sea region 
compared to the Baltic Sea region. The level 
and complexity of the Northern Fleet is more 
advanced than that of the Baltic Fleet in 
terms of operational preparedness, advanced 
weaponry and deployment of modern ships 
and aircrafts. 
This difference in priority has been 
noticeable since the end of the Cold War. The 
dissolution of the Soviet Union limited Russia’s 
access to the Baltic Sea, reducing its strategic 
advantage for Russia and adding to the 
Barents Sea region’s relative importance.5 The 
importance of the Barents Sea region has been 
and still is associated with the region’s nuclear 
capabilities. The Northern Fleet is the largest 
and most modern part of the Russian navy and 
has the biggest concentration of nuclear-based 
submarines. These nuclear weapons constitute 
a part of the few remaining symbols of Russia’s 
great power status on par with the US. Since 
the year 2000, Russia’s attention to the region 
has been increasingly associated with the 
large amount of the region’s natural resources. 
These strategic reserves will secure Russia’s 
economic future and thus its power status. 
This, too, added to the Barents Sea region’s 
relative importance. 
The differences between Russia’s approach 
to the two regions can be understood by 
examining factors such as geography, economic 
and military interests, and historical relations 
with neighbours. However, as this insight 
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outlined threats concerning the Barents Sea 
region, this was not the case for the Baltic Sea 
region. Does this mean that Russia does not see 
any threats in the Baltic Sea region? Looking 
at official declarations and statements by 
officials and politicians, it is clear that general 
guidelines found in doctrines and concepts 
apply to all regions, including the Baltic Sea 
region. For instance, during a press conference 
the Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov 
stated that “the escalating NATO military 
activity in close proximity to Russian borders 
in the Baltic Sea region is worrying”.9 
Considering this, Russia’s threat perceptions 
in the Baltic Sea region stem from NATO’s 
military presence and deployment of military 
contingents in Russia’s neighbouring countries. 
Other threats alluded to in the security 
policy documents are the establishment 
and deployment of the strategic US missile 
defence system and the potential of Finnish 
and Swedish NATO membership. These threat 
perceptions explain why Russia increased its 
security in the Baltic Sea region. 
That said, although Russia’s threat 
perceptions are highlighted by the country’s 
security policy documents, taking Russian 
statements about its threat perceptions as 
an absolute could lead to a false conclusion. 
Therefore, one must be aware of what is 
rhetoric and what is connected to changes on 
the ground.
Threats in the Barents Sea region
NATO’s military activities
One threat that has prompted Russia to 
increase its security more in the Barents Sea 
region than in the Baltic Sea region is NATO’s 
military activities, such as the deployment of 
NATO’s military contingents and the US missile 
defence system near the Russian border. Russia 
has accused the US and NATO of increasing 
its military contingent in the states bordering 
the Russian Federation, as well as in adjacent 
waters, especially during the Trident Juncture 
joint exercise in 2018. A force of 350 US 
soldiers was stationed in Northern Norway 
until August 202010. This deployment has been 
described as a threat by the Russian embassy 
in Norway, which stated that these activities 
raise “serious concerns”. In a comment posted 
on Facebook, the Russian embassy points out 
that this incident makes Norway unpredictable 
and might increase tension, initiate an arms 
race, and lead to destabilisation of the situation 
in Europe.11 
Furthermore, Russia has also reacted 
negatively to NATO member states’ 
development of military defence in the Barents 
Sea region. For example, Russian authorities 
often refer to the Globus 3 radar in Vardø and 
the deployment of US naval vessels equipped 
with Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence system 
(BMD).12 While the Globus 3 can be used to 
detect, track, and identify Russian activities, 
naval vessels equipped with Aegis BMD can 
destroy targets in the air, on the surface and 
underwater and potentially open access to the 
Russian coast from international Arctic waters. 
NATO’s military activities, especially the 
first-time deployment of US soldiers and the 
deployment of elements of the US missile 
defence system, could indicate a growing 
Western interest in the region. In Russia, the 
threat is considered severe due to the region’s 
proximity to Russian nuclear capabilities 
and to the natural resources securing 
Russia’s future international position. The 
development of a missile defence system in 
the Barents Sea region has repeatedly been 
singled out in official statements. In May 2021, 
the commander of Russia’s Northern Fleet, 
Admiral Alexander Moiseyev, argued that the 
presence of NATO ships in the Barents Sea and 
the Norwegian Sea has reached levels unseen 
since World War II. According to him, “Such 
actions are provocative and have a negative 
impact on regional security”.13  Similarly, this 
view has also been voiced earlier by President 
Vladimir Putin, who argued that the US nuclear 
submarines are already concentrated in the 
Barents Sea. In 2013, he estimated that the 
missiles from those submarines could reach 
Moscow in 16–17 minutes; he reduced this 
estimate to 15–16 minutes in 2014 and further 
to 15 minutes in 2017.14
However, Russian sources offer no data 
on the number, duration or schedules for any 
concentration of US submarines, nor is there 
any information on how the Northern Fleet 
deals with such submarines. It is therefore 
difficult to assess the extent of the threat.  
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Similarly, the Globus 3 radar system on its own 
is not a threat. Russia often draws attention 
to NATO military activities in the Barents 
Sea region, portraying them as hostile and 
provocative, even when they do not infringe 
on recognised Russian rights. Considering that 
Russia’s military capabilities are generally 
greater than those of NATO in the Barents 
Sea region, the perception of threat reflects 
enduring Russian national security interests. 
Again, Russia’s approach prioritises military 
capabilities over intentions.
Unresolved legal issues 
Unresolved legal issues also explain why Russia 
increased its security more in the Barents 
Sea Region than in the Baltic Sea region. One 
such issue is in the conflicted positions on the 
legal status of the maritime zones covered 
by the Svalbard Treaty of 1920. While the 
Svalbard Treaty granted Norway sovereignty 
over Svalbard, it also gave Russia and more 
than 40 other signatories, such as the US, 
the UK, Denmark, Sweden and France, the 
right to undertake economic activities in the 
archipelago.15 How far that right extends is 
however a matter of interpretation. Norway’s 
view is that the treaty does not apply to 
the economic zone around the archipelago, 
claiming coastal state jurisdiction and exclusive 
rights to the natural resources of the maritime 
zones adjacent to the archipelago. The oil-rich 
continental shelf and abundant fishing stock 
in the superjacent waters of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) are accordingly not 
available for exploitation by signatory states. 
Russia, on the other hand, disagrees and 
argues that rights to equal access apply on 
Svalbard and in the territorial waters, and that 
it consequently enjoys the right to undertake 
economic activities.16 
Lack of agreement on this issue has led to 
undesirable incidents between Norway and 
Russia in the past. For instance, the Norwegian 
Coast Guard has attempted to seize Russian 
fishing vessels on several occasions, resulting 
in reactions from Russia. Some of the most 
severe incidents that had the potential to 
escalate beyond the fishing issues took place 
in 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2011.17 Such issues 
cannot be excluded in the future as this threat 
could lead to confrontation between Russia and 
Norway. The issue is a sensitive one for Russia, 
given that Norway is a member of NATO and 
the Svalbard archipelago is covered by Article 
V of the North Atlantic Treaty. On the other 
hand, Russia has long felt discriminated against 
on the Svalbard issue, which is regularly 
raised with Norwegian authorities in bilateral 
meetings on several levels and is therefore not 
likely to escalate tensions in itself. Both Russia 
and Norway have an interest in maintaining 
peace in the region.  
Another legal issue is the coastal states’ 
overlapping claims to extend their continental 
shelves, submitted to the UN Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). 
Russia claims the outer limits of its Arctic 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, 
expanding the region by 1.2 million square 
kilometres. In effect, Russia claims rights to a 
continental shelf which may hold 4.9 billion 
tonnes of oil equivalents. This claim overlaps 
“substantially” with Denmark’s and Canada’s 
claims.18 Russia sees this as a challenge as there 
is a possibility that its claims may be rejected, 
and Russia will stand to lose parts of the Arctic 
to NATO countries. Thus, in case of a rejection, 
overlapping claims may trigger a negative 
development. 
On the contrary, as Russia is one of the main 
beneficiaries of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regime, both 
in terms of economic zones and continental 
shelf, Russia is unlikely to take steps that would 
undermine the convention. Hence, in case of 
overlapping claims, bilateral or multilateral 
negotiations between the parties involved 
would be expected to be peacefully resolved. 
Even if a CLCS decision were to upset Russia, 
this alone would be unlikely to cause war. 
Finally, the third legal issue in the Barents 
Sea region of concern to Russia relates to 
differing views on which legal framework 
applies to the Northern Sea Route (NSR) 
and its passages. Russia defines the NSR as a 
national transportation route under Russian 
jurisdiction, giving Russia control over the 
passages for world trade and commerce 
through the straits between the Russian 
archipelagos. This view is based on Article 
234 of the UNCLOS, which gives the coastal 
state authority to develop and administer non- 
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discriminatory regulations for vessel activity 
in ice-covered waters.19 The US, on the other 
hand, regards the NSR as an international strait 
which is open for transit passages and thus 
is subject to international law.20 The lack of 
consensus has led to a situation where neither 
side recognises each other’s right to control 
the NSR and its passages. One can only assume 
that both the US and Russia would want to 
secure access to the NSR, especially if maritime 
traffic increases and the seaway becomes more 
advantageous commercially. 
Adding to Russia’s sense of threat, 
the US has not signed the UNCLOS upon 
which Russia’s jurisdiction is based. This 
means there is a lack of dispute-resolving 
mechanisms, which may increase the danger of 
confrontation. Nevertheless, although the US 
has not signed the UNCLOS, it has recognised 
it as a codification of customary international 
law. As such it is unlikely the US will have this 
unresolved legal issue high on its agenda. 
If challenges were to happen, it is expected 
that both the US and Russia would follow the 
UNCLOS rules as it is in both their interests to 
prevent military confrontation in the region.  
Natural resources  
Finally, competition over natural resources in 
the Barents Sea region is another threat that 
explains the differences in Russia’s security 
policy. According to US Geological Survey 
(USGS) estimates from 2008, the Arctic 
region holds 90 billion barrels of oil, 1.669 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion 
barrels of natural gas liquids.21 Russia holds 
the greatest share of these resources, both 
on land and on the shelf itself. According to 
official Russian sources, up to 80 percent of the 
country’s known gas reserves and 90 percent 
of its hydrocarbon deposits are located in the 
Arctic, and 70 percent is located in the Barents 
and Kara seas.22
There was a widespread perception in 
Russia that the expected growth in global 
demand for energy, together with declining 
energy production worldwide, could lead to 
rivalries and competition with international 
companies and state actors.23 This argues 
that Russia, with its enormous share of 
global natural resources, may in the future 
become an object of a large-scale expansion. 
Such competition could eventually lead to 
conflict.  To illustrate this threat, Russia’s 
National Security Strategy has declared that 
“international policy will focus on access to 
energy resources in …. The Barents Sea and 
other regions of the Arctic….”.24 The document 
does not rule out the possibility of using 
military force to resolve these threats. The 
conviction that competition over natural 
resources may cause greater tension and pose 
a threat to Russia has also been voiced by 
Russian president Vladimir Putin, who claimed 
that the competition for resources is increasing 
and some are making attempts to set aside the 
rules.25 
On the other hand, the competition for 
natural resources should not be exaggerated, 
since 95 percent of the resources are already 
located within the national jurisdictions of 
the Arctic states.26 The probability of a conflict 
in the Barents Sea region is therefore small. 
Furthermore, energy market observers regard 
these resources as likely to become stranded, 
due to high extraction costs as well as reduced 
demand in markets. 
All in all, considering that Russia’s threat 
perceptions in the Barents Sea region are 
not about real dangers, it is possible that 
unsubstantiated claims are partly Russian 
rhetoric used to justify an increased military 
presence.
Russia’s threat perceptions in the Baltic Sea 
region 
NATO’s military activities 
The threats found in the security policy 
documents regarding the Baltic Sea region 
are all related to NATO activity. Especially 
important are the deployment of NATO military 
contingents near the Russian border and the 
deployment of the US missile defence system. 
Russia’s Defence Minister, Sergey Shoygu, has 
stated that NATO is constantly increasing the 
intensity of operational and combat training 
near Russian borders. According to him, 
about four battalion tactical groups consisting 
of 5 000 troops, a core feature of the NATO 
Readiness Action Plan (RAP), have been 
assembled in the Baltic countries and Poland.27 
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This force is a part of a larger NATO Response 
Force (NRF), which in 2017 grew to 40 000 in 
the Baltic Sea region.28 This compares to 350 
soldiers deployed in the Barents Sea region. 
Consequently, there is a larger number of 
NATO’s contingents in the Baltic Sea region 
than in the Barents Sea region. 
Another threat for Russia in the Baltic 
Sea region is the deployment of the missile 
defence system. Deployed in the Baltic Sea 
region, these systems will, as in the Barents Sea 
region, be targeting Russia’s strategic nuclear 
forces and with a first strike could prevent 
Russian retaliation.29 Russian authorities have 
repeatedly accused the US and its allies of 
deploying elements of such missile defence 
systems close to borders between Russia and 
NATO member states.30 In a meeting with 
Russian military leaders in May 2016, Putin 
discussed NATO’s deployment of the US missile 
defence system, arguing that it is a build-up 
rather than a defence mechanism.31 This view 
was supported by Russian foreign minister 
Sergey Lavrov, who indicated that Russia has 
a negative attitude to NATO’s activities close 
to Russian borders. According to him, “there 
are no threats in the Baltic region that would 
justify its militarization”.32 As such, Russia’s 
increased activities may be a result of Russia 
being vulnerable in the region due to a higher 
NATO presence since 2014. Therefore, Russia 
will be more disposed towards an active 
defence of its interests. 
That said, although NATO’s activities in 
the region have increased, this could reflect 
Russia’s behaviour since 2014. Russia had 
several encounters with the West that could 
have sparked a military or political conflict. 
Documented examples include Russian 
intercepts and violations of the airspace of 
Estonia, Finland and Sweden, a suspected 
Russian submarine incursion into Swedish 
territorial waters, and the abduction and 
illegal Russian detention of Estonian security 
service operative Eston Kohver from Estonian 
territory.33 One can argue that both Russia and 
NATO members are increasing their security in 
the region and legitimising their activities by 
mutual accusations. Thus, both parties seem 
to be stepping into a vicious circle of security 
dilemma to maintain and strengthen their 
military capabilities. 
Sweden and Finland’s potential membership to 
NATO 
Another threat in the Baltic Sea region is the 
potential NATO membership of Sweden and 
Finland. Of the nine coastal states to the Baltic 
Sea, six currently hold NATO membership. 
Non-members Sweden and Finland maintain 
close cooperation with the Alliance. Since 2009, 
Sweden maintains a solidarity declaration with 
NATO as well as several bilateral agreements 
with its neighbours, all to the effect that 
Sweden will not remain passive if an EU 
Member State or a Nordic country suffers 
a disaster or an attack.34 Therefore, it is in 
Russia’s interest to prevent any development of 
closer relations between NATO and Sweden or 
Finland. Were Sweden and Finland to become 
NATO members, Russia would be surrounded 
by NATO in the Baltic Sea region. Russia fears 
that NATO would gain an important strategic 
position in the Baltic Sea region, which would 
affect the status quo in not only the Baltic Sea 
region but the whole of Northern Europe.  
Russia alleges that this potential change 
represents a broken a promise by the West, at 
the end of the Cold War, not to enlarge NATO 
beyond the borders of a reunified Germany. 
On this matter, the Russian foreign policy 
concept states that it “respects the choice of 
European states that are not members of any 
military alliances, these states are making 
genuine contribution to ensuring stability 
and security in Europe”.35  Although Swedish 
or Finnish NATO membership would thus be 
received as a threat to Russia, it is not of great 
concern considering that neither Sweden 
nor Finland have sought NATO membership 
and the governments in both countries have 
declared their neutrality and opposed NATO 
membership.   
Nevertheless, the issue is highly contested 
in both countries. In Finland, the leading party 
has come out openly in favour of membership, 
but the majority of the political parties remain 
opposed or hesitant to membership.36 This 
view is also reflected by public opinion, 
where the majority of citizens are opposed 
to membership.37 Similarly, Sweden has been 
opposed to NATO membership. According to 
Swedish Foreign Minister Anne Linde, such 
a decision would be negative for the safety 
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of Sweden and should be discussed broadly. 
However, since the end of 2020, a change has 
taken place. When discussing this issue in the 
Riksdag (Swedish parliament), the majority 
of political parties shifted in favour of NATO 
membership.38 Likewise, public opinion in 
Sweden is turning more NATO-friendly.39 
However, whether Sweden decides to join 
NATO or not remains to be seen during the next 
election in 2022. 
Russia’s threat perceptions in the Baltic 
Sea region seem to be a more genuine threat 
than what Russia perceives in the Barents Sea 
region. Thus, these threat perceptions should 
be taken into consideration when aiming to 
developing effective dialogue and cooperation 
with Russia.
Future prospects
Russia has increased its security measures in 
both the Barents Sea and Baltic Sea regions 
over the past decades. However, the Barents 
Sea region has been prioritised because Russia 
sees a trend of increasing NATO activities in 
the Barents Sea region. This is home to Russian 
nuclear capabilities and natural resources 
and will secure Russia’s economic future and 
therefore, power status. Furthermore, due to 
expected changes to the climate, Russia expects 
an increase in asymmetrical threats coming 
from non-governmental actors. Asymmetrical 
threats would be, for instance, terrorism, illegal 
migration, smuggling of narcotics, and other 
forms of transnational organised crime.40 
Hence, it is expected that Russia will 
continue to prioritise the Barents Sea region, 
but the development of one does not exclude 
the other. Both regions play different roles in 
Russian strategic thinking and consequently 
call for different sets of capabilities and 
types of military activity. Russia’s political 
leadership has already invested quite a lot in 
both regions, with numerous plans for military 
development to increase security. Just how 
many of these plans Russia will be able to carry 
out remains uncertain. The outcome depends 
on several factors related to the economy, 
such as widespread corruption and a lack 
of efficiency in the defence industry.41 These 
challenges make it likely that Russia will have 
to curtail certain projects in the coming years. 
For instance, their financial problems have 
already put pressure on the government to 
alter the state armament programme for 2016-
2025, which had to be postponed for three 
years.42 Thus, the need to prioritise in such an 
economic environment will be a key factor in 
the future for increased security measures in 
the Barents Sea region compared to that of the 
Baltic Sea region.
Prioritising the Barents Sea region, as this 
insight illustrates, is of great importance to 
Russia now and will be in the coming decades. 
However, threat perceptions on their own 
cannot explain why Russia has prioritized 
these regions. Russia faces threats from several 
shared borders with NATO members. It is 
the Barents Sea region’s strategic, tactical 
and economic importance, combined with an 
increase in NATO activity, that explains why 
Russia has increased its security measures 
there more than in the Baltic Sea Region.
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